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This dissertation focuses on two major topics in transportation and international trade fields. 
The first one is about transportation policy which is the privatization of Japanese National 
Railway (JNR) in 1987. Due to the heavy deficit, JNR was decided to be privatized and 
geographically divided into six companies for passenger transport service. This division 
changed the market condition on the busiest route in Japanese railway industry-Tokyo-Osaka 
route, namely some regions changed from previous monopoly condition to the duopoly 
condition after 1987 with some regions stayed in monopoly as it was before. We investigated 
the impact of market competition after JNR’s privatization in 1987 on passengers’ time cost by 
high-speed rail (HSR) and conventional rail (CR) through two different studies separately as 
showed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. These two studies are empirical studies which base on the 
panel and secondary data taken from published JR timetables in four different years, 1976, 
1986, 1996 and 2006. Through HSR study in Chapter 2, we find that the increased market 
competition by duopoly decreases the HSR time cost by around 4 minutes on average, namely 
10% of average time cost for OD pairs, relative to monopoly, while the speed of Shinkansen 
just increased by 21% in last 50 years. As well, results show that the market competition effect 
is larger for longer distance trip. However, in the conventional rail study (Chapter 3), analysis 
results do not show any evidences about the impact of market competition on passengers’ time 
cost by taking conventional rail. Besides, in these two studies, simplified theoretical models 
about the impact of market competition on passengers’ time cost are also constructed for 
analysis.  
The second topic is related to international trade policy, which is the trade liberalization 
under the globalization background. This topic is discussed as showed in Chapter 4 through 
theoretical models and assumptions, which investigates the impact of trade liberalization on 
regional real income inequality in an endogenous growth model. This study is a theoretical 
study which constructs a footloose capital and endogenous growth model with agriculture, 
manufacturing and service goods. Results show that effects of globalization may positive, 
negative, or zero because the service price index and expenditure converge while the 
manufacturing price index diverges. Differences between interregional knowledge spillover 
minus intraregional knowledge spillover in the service sector determines the sign of the 
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This dissertation includes two important and popular research topics in economics field: (1) 
the impact of market competition on transport service quality; (2) the effect of trade 
liberalization on regional real income inequality. Both of these two topics are related to 
transportation economics and international trade. Basically, we are interested in the market 
competition in transportation field, and the global trade liberalization which take consider of 
transportation cost. We study the first topic by using the privatization of Japanese National 
Railway (JNR) in 1987 as an example, and the second topic is analyzed through a theoretical 
study.  
Regard to the first topic, due to heavy deficit in operation, the JNR was decided to be 
privatized and geographically divided into six different companies for passengers transporting 
service and one company for goods transporting service. As the busiest route in Japanese 
railway industry, Tokyo-Osaka route had some changes in the intensity of the market 
competition. Before 1987, both the high-speed rail (HSR) service and conventional rail (CR) 
service on this route was provided by JNR, namely no market competition between HSR and 
CR on this route. However, after the privatization of JNR in 1987, the HSR service on this 
route is still provided by one company-Central Japan Railway Company (JR Central), with CR 
service on this route provided by three different railway companies, namely East Japan Railway 
Company (JR East), Central Japan Railway Company (JR Central) and West Japan Railway 
Company (JR West). Some segments on this route are still in monopoly as it was before 1987 
with some segments on this route changed from monopoly to duopoly after 1987. Therefore, 
we came with the research question that whether the market competition after 1987 had impact 
on the services quality that railway companies provided and how big the impact was. Then we 
investigate the impact of market competition on rail transport services quality measured by 
passengers’ time cost. The impact of market competition on HSR service and CR service are 
separately discussed in two different studies as showed in the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Both 
of these two studies are empirical researches which use difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach by analyzing a four years panel data.  
Due to the innovations in transportation field, say the development in transportation 





much more convenient than before since last century which contribute a lot to the trade 
globalization and trade liberalization. And we came with a research question that whether the 
trade liberalization benefits the relatively disadvantage countries by reducing the regional 
income inequality between poor countries and rich countries. Different from the first topic that 
employs the econometric approach to investigate the impact of market competition, the second 
topic is discussed in Chapter 4 by using a theoretical approach. Through theoretical models 
and related assumptions, this study for second topic investigates the effect of trade 
liberalization on regional real income inequality in an endogenous growth model with 
manufacturing, agriculture and service goods. 
As additional information, Chapter 2 is based on the joint study with associate professor 
Takahiro Ito and professor Yuichiro Yoshida. Professor Yuichiro Yoshida came with the idea, 
supervised in the conduction of this study and an early version of the manuscript. Takahiro Ito 
constructed the econometric models and did the econometric analysis. I collected all the raw 
data, made econometric analysis and made many revisions to the early draft of manuscript 
according to our update analysis results and the update version of manuscript is as showed in 
the Chapter 2. The study in Chapter 3 is a joint study with professor Yuichiro Yoshida. A 
version of Chapter 3 has been accepted for publication by Journal of International Development 
and Cooperation, and will be published in the Volume.26, No.1 soon. I conducted most of the 
work, including the data collection, econometric models constructing and data analysis, result 
interpretation and I also wrote the first draft of the manuscript. Professor Yuichiro Yoshida 
supervised me in the data collection and data analysis processes, also provided valuable 
suggestions. The study in Chapter 4 is a joint study with Dr. Katsufumi Fukuda. A version of 
Chapter 4 has been accepted for publication by Journal of International Development and 
Cooperation, and will be published in the Volume.26, No.1 soon. Dr. Katsufumi Fukuda 
brought the idea and helped a lot in building the models for analysis. The rest of the whole 






2. Does Monopoly Slow Down a Bullet Train? 
2.1. Introduction  
Japan National Railways (JNR), a state-owned public corporation that founded in 1949 and 
provided railway services nation-wide was dismantled into six regional railway companies for 
passenger transport service in 1987. As result for dismantling of JNR, each of the six railway 
companies is in charge of both the high-speed rail (HSR, which was named as Shinkansen in 
Japan) and a conventional rail in its respective region. There emerged, however, a limited 
number of areas with an increased level of market competition, where HSR and conventional 
rail are operated by two separate companies due to an operational reason. By utilizing this 
variation in the competitive pressure from a conventional rail, this study measures the impact 
of market competition on supply behaviors of an oligopolistic HSR transport service provider. 
Specifically, from the published timetables, we obtain the change in time cost, namely the in-
vehicle time and schedule delay (early) of traveling on HSR train before and after the JNR’s 
privatization. This study finds that the passengers’ time cost of taking HSR is reduced in the 
duopoly region, relatively to that in the area that is in monopoly. This study also find that the 
impact of market competition is larger for relative longer distance trip. 
Since the privatization process started in 1987, JNR was geographically divided into six 
Japan Railway (JR) companies for passenger transport service.1 In principle, each of them is 
in charge of both HSR and parallelly running conventional rail in the designated region. 
Exception to this principle emerged in greater Tokyo and greater Osaka, the first and the second 
largest metropolitan areas of Japan. This is because the conventional rail service on Tokyo-
Osaka route is separately provided by three different JR companies, namely JR East, JR Central 
and JR West, while the HSR service on whole Tokyo-Osaka route is only provided by JR 
Central. Therefore, in great Tokyo area, the conventional rail service was provided by JR East 
with HSR service provided by JR Central; in great Osaka area, the conventional rail service 
was provided by JR West with HSR service provided by JR Central. However, the conventional 
                                                 
1The six JR companies are Hokkaido Railway Company (JR Hokkaido), East Japan Railway Company (JR East), Central Japan Railway 






rail and HSR service in the central part of Japan is owned and only operated by JR Central. 
This created a difference in the intensity of market competition where HSR and conventional 
rail services are either monopolized or duopolized after the privatization. This conforms the 
design of the current research that measures the difference in the impact of duopoly and 
monopoly before and after the privatization of railway services. 
Shinkansen, as known as a “bullet train”, started running in 1964. The zero series, a bullet-
shaped train car designed exclusively for Shinkansen ran on the newly developed track of 552.6 
km length between Tokyo and Osaka at the maximum operational speed of 210 km/h. It 
connected these two largest cities of Japan in 3 hours and 10 minutes, which is less than a half 
of the fastest conventional express trains at that time. As a result, there are two parallel rail 
tracks that connect major cities between Tokyo and Osaka, namely, HSR (Shinkansen) and the 
conventional rail. The following Table 2-1 summarizes the differences between these two 
modes of rail transport along this largest trunk rote in Japan. 
 
Table 2–1 Characteristics of Shinkansen (HSR) and Conventional Rail in 1965 
 Shinkansen (HSR) Conventional Rail 
Maximum speed 210 km/h1 110 km/h 
Average speed2 171.8 km/h1 86.0 km/h 
Minimum travel time2 3 hours 10 minutes1 6 hours 30 minutes 
Gauge 1,435 mm 1,067 mm 
Minimum curve radius2 2,500 m 400 m 
Total length of tunnels2 68.0 km 27.0 km 
Road crossings     None About 1,100 
Length of a train car 25.0 m 20.5 m 
Width of a train car 3.38 m 2.95 m 
 
Notes: 1 These values are just one-year after Shinkansen HSR firstly operated in 1964. 2 These values are between Tokyo and 
Osaka. Data source: Japan National Railways. 
 
On April 1st, 1987, Japan National Railways (JNR) was divided geographically into six 
Japan Railway (JR) companies as showed in the following Figure 2-1. In principle, each of the 





region.2 For example, JR East company is in charge of the area east of Atami city (Shizuoka 
Ken) including greater Tokyo, and JR West company is covering western part of mainland 
Japan beyond Maibara city (Shiga Ken) including greater Osaka. While the provision of 
conventional rail services between Tokyo and Osaka is divided into three different companies 
at Atami and Maibara as mentioned above, with HSR is operated throughout by one single 
company, namely JR Central for practicality of operation. This situation is summarized in the 

























                                                 
2 There is no HSR service in the region that Shikoku railway company in charge of. 





Table 2–2 Operators of Railways between Tokyo and Osaka after Dissolution of JNR 
 Segments 
Type of Service Tokyo-Atami Atami-Maibara Maibara-Osaka 
High Speed Rail JR Central JR Central JR Central 
Conventional Rail JR East JR Central JR West 













When these six JR companies were founded, they were regarded as special corporations 
because JNR Settlement Corporation-a public entity to settle the huge debt that JNR left-still 
owned the entire share. JNR was badly in red at that time. Its huge debt was not only due to 
investment, but also by the cumulated operational losses over the years. JR companies took 
over about a third of JNR’s debt of 37.1 trillion yen back then, while two third were supposed 
to be paid by selling their shares in the stock market later on. Though they were publicly owned, 
the new JR companies were expected to make as much profit as possible and pay back the debt 
as soon as possible. JR companies who inherited a large, if not excessive, number of employees 
and unprofitable routes in rural areas, had to improve their operational efficiency greatly in 
order to be profitable. 
Three JR companies in mainland Japan, namely JR East, JR Central and JR West did well 
by exploiting the market power as regional monopoly. Price back then was set by the 
government based on their cost with a fixed markup. Their high cost implied high price set by 
the government. This high price enabled them to cash in their market power as they improved 





their operational efficiency. JR East was listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1993 and JR West 
was in 1996, followed by JR Central in 1997. By April 2006, all these three companies’ stocks 
were sold entirely to private shareholders. 
Until they were excluded in 2001, these three JR companies were regulated by JR 
Corporation Law.3 Under the law, price change required government’s approval. Indeed, price 
has not been changed since 1987 until January 1996, when three JR companies outside of 
mainland Japan for the first-time requested system-wide price change and were granted 
approval. However, JR East, JR Central and JR West did not change their price even then, and 
in fact not ever since the start of JNR’s privatization process until now.4 We therefore measure 
the treatment effect of the market competition on time cost in this study. For the years after 
JNR privatization, we focus on two time points when three mainland JR companies started and 
completed public listing, namely 1996 and 2006. For the years before JNR privatization, we 
use the year 1976 and year 1986, which use ten years as time gap.  
Market competition is the most classic, if not the most important issue in Economics 
(Chamberlin, 1933;). In fact, there exists a vast theoretical literature on the role and the impact 
of market competition (Lerner, 1934; Abbott, 1955; Fujita, 1988; Parenti, et al., 2017;). Theory 
tells that competition increases quality when price is regulated. However, when firms set both 
price and quality, the impact of competition is ambiguous (Spence, 1975;). Some models 
predict competition increases quality (Tirole, 1988; Pepall, et al., 2005;).5 In contrast to the 
theoretical literature, empirical literature on causal inference of competition impact is limited.6 
Masta (2011) examines the effect of competition in the US supermarket industry by utilizing 
Walmart store openings as an exogenous shock to local markets. Busso and Galiani (2015), 
which is the first and sole experimental study in the literature, explores the impact of 
competition among grocery stores on prices and quality of goods in the Dominican Republic 
                                                 
3 Other three (JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu) currently are still regulated under the law. 
4 This is mostly due to political pressure that privatization cannot be associated with price increase. However, ever since JR companies are 
established, Japanese economy has not facing continuous deflation, that effectively increased the relative price. There is common political 
sentiment or phobia, among formerly state-owned and then privatized regional monopolies, such as highway, electricity and railway 
companies, regarding discussing prices, especially when they are being profitable. 
5 See appendix for the theoretical illustration in our context. 
6 There exist several papers attempting to identify the impact of market competition. For instance, Domberger and Sherr (1989) is on the 
market for conveyancing legal services in England and Wales; Hoxby (2000) on school education in the US; Mazzeo (2003) on the US airline 
industry; Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) on the manufacturing industry. Some of them exploit quasi/natural experiment settings to isolate the 
impact of competitive environment, such as the timing of a policy implementation and geographical feature. However, none of these studies 





by randomizing the entry of new grocery store in a conditional cash transfer program. 
Background of this limited empirical literature is a lack of “good” exogenous variation, while 
experiment is almost impossible. This is largely due to the fact that the intensity of market 
competition is typically time-invariant, and therefore only cross-sectional data are available. 
As a result, in many studies, heterogeneity between units in treatment and control is seriously 
large, which leads to confounding say, by self-selection. Reverse causality is also likely to bias 
the result if a company with high product quality kicks out others and thus reduces the 
competition. This study adds to a few empirical studies that measures the impact of competition 
by using exogenous variation arising from a natural experimental setting along with unit-of-
observation fixed effects. 
In the section 2.2, we will explain our data and empirical strategy in detail. Section 2.3 
presents the results and section 2.4 concludes the study. 
2.2. Identification Strategy and Data 
2.2.1 Identification Strategy 
To estimate the impact of change in the intensity of market competition between the treatment 
group and control group, in this study, it employs the difference-in-differences (DID) approach 
as an identification strategy, which with OD pair and year fixed effect by using a panel data in 
four years (1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006). By using the OD pair and year fixed effects, we could 
eliminate the bias from potential omitted variables, such as unobserved time-variant variables 
and time-invariant variables. 
The DID approach employed in this study measures the difference between the changes 
for outcome variable in treatment group and control group among same period, which is the 
average treatment effect, namely the market competition. 
Econometric framework in this study is as follows:  
 
                            𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  α(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡)  + β𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ϕ𝑖 + φ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 （1） 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 as outcome variable and it is time cost for directional OD pair i in year t in this study. 





either the Tokyo-Atami route or the Maibara-Osaka route and zero otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is after 
treatment year dummy, and it equals to 1 if the year is after 1987, namely 1996 and 2006, and 
0 otherwise. ϕ𝑖 and φ𝑡 are OD fixed effect and year fixed effect, respectively, with 𝜀𝑖𝑡 as error 
term. α is the coefficient for the interaction term with treatment dummy and post dummy, 
namely the estimator of treatment effect in this study. Variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables 
which depend on model specification.  
2.2.2 Data 
As can be seen in the Table 2-2, those segments, Tokyo-Atami and Maibara-Osaka are in 
duopoly after JNR’ privatization in 1987, while Atami-Maibara segment remained as in 
monopoly. Our unit of analysis is a directional pair of Shinkansen stations, one being the origin 
and another being the destination, which we refer to as an OD pair. We group OD pairs into 
two: one with those OD pairs such that the entire journey is contained in the duopolized area, 
and another with those such that both their origin and destination stations ae in the mopolized 
area. We refer to the former as the treatment group and the latter as the control group. In this 
study, we use the HSR stations already existed in 1976 and exist for all the four years. There 
are two intermediate stations between Tokyo and Atami; six stations between Atami and 
Maibara and only one station between Maibara and Osaka.7 Therefore the total number of 
directional OD pairs is 18 in the treatment area and the number in the control area is 56 for one 
year. 
As the distance for the OD pairs in control area is much longer when comparing with OD 
pairs in treatment area, the OD pairs in our control area is not well balanced with OD pairs in 
our treatment area. Then we keep all the OD pairs in the treatment area and pick up the OD 
pairs in control group which are near the borders (Atami and Maibara). Our treatment area is 
consisted of two parts, one is greater Tokyo area (Tokyo-Atami route) and the other one is 
greater Osaka area (Maibara-Osaka route). For greater Tokyo area, route Tokyo-Atami has 
four stations which located in treatment area and we pick up another fours stations (Atami, 
Mishima, Shizuoka and Hamamatsu) near the border “Atami” station which located in control 
area; for greater Osaka area, router Maibara-Osaka has three stations which located in treatment 
area and we pick up another three stations (Nagoya, Gifu-Hashima and Maibara) near the 
                                                 
7The Shinkansen stations used in our study then are, from east to west, Tokyo, Shin-Yokohama, Odawara, Atami, Mishima, Shizuoka, 





border “Maibara” station which located in control area.8 Then, in our study, our treatment 
group is consisted of OD pairs on “Tokyo-Atami” route and “Maibara-Osaka” route, and our 
control group is consisted of OD pairs on “Atami-Hamamatsu” route and “Nagoya-Maibara” 
route. Therefore, there are 18 OD pairs in treatment group and another 18 OD pairs in control 
group for each year. Then we have 36 OD pairs for each year, which with 144 OD pairs in total 
for all the four years included in this study. 
Our outcome variable is users’ time cost. Users’ time cost of a trip between an OD pair is 
a sum of the in-vehicle time and schedule delay. Schedule delay is the time difference between 
the train actual arrival time and the passengers’ target arrival time. Since delay is not allowed 
in our study for analysis, the schedule delay in this study is namely schedule delay early. In-
vehicle time and schedule delay (early) on the four time points before and after the privatization 
of JNR corporation in 1987 is collected, namely for year 1976, year 1986, year 1996 and year 
2006 from the timetables published by Japan Travel Bureau (JTB). Treatment year is as 
mentioned above, either 1996 or 2006. Duopoly dummy takes the value of one in the treatment 
years if the OD pair is in the duopolized area, and zero otherwise.  
In order to measure user’ time cost of an OD pair, we generate 50 hypothetical target 
arrival times from a uniform distribution between 6:00 AM and 12:00 midnight. This reflects 
the fact that Shinkansen provides HSR services for inter-city travel that do not exhibit obvious 
peak hours, and also that by regulation the operation of Shinkansen is restricted from 6:00AM 
up to midnight. For each of these 50 target arrival time, a train that minimizes the user’ time 
cost is picked, and this kind of time cost is recorded for all the OD pairs. In this study, we 
assume that late arrivals are not allowed.9 Then the average of these time values is computed 
to yield the in-vehicle time and schedule-delay data for each OD pair. We compute the average 
time cost for all four years (1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006). 
The following Table 2-3 presents balance test of baseline characteristics between OD pairs 
in monopoly and duopoly areas, namely control group and treatment group. Except for 
population and number of competing private railway companies, there are no significant 
difference between treatment group and control group in the other related variables. As showed 
in Panel A of Table 2-3, population in treatment group is significantly higher than the 
population in control group. This is due to that the cities (such as Tokyo and Osaka) in 
                                                 
8 Atami and Maibara stations are bordering stations which are considered both in treatment and control areas.  





treatment group are with bigger population than cities in control group. Similarly, as showed 
in the Panel A of Table 2-3, the number of competing private railway companies in treatment 
group is significantly more than that in control group. This is due to treatment group with more 
population which comes with more transport demand, and more demand always with more 
providers. Fortunately, as showed in the Panel B of Table 2-3, change in population in 
treatment group is not significantly different from the change in control group. Besides, since 
the number of competing private railway firms does not change over the years, we do this 
balance test by taking the number of the competing private railway firms per million capita. 
The result is showed as in Panel B of Table 2-3, which is that the change in number of 
competing private railway firms per million capita in treatment is not significant different form 
that in control group. All these prove that common-trend assumption is satisfied which 
conforms research design in this study. Besides, robustness checks by considering the influence 
of population size and number of competing private railway firms will be showed in the 
following empirical results section. 
 
Table 2–3 Balancing Test of Baseline Characteristics 
 Control (monopoly)  Treatment (duopoly) (2) – (4) 
 N. Obs Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 




 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Comparison by Level (using 1976 and 1986 data) 


















Population/10,000 36 47.166 
(61.541) 




Income per capita 36 1,652.92 
(759.390) 








Distance 18 75.200 
(43.598) 




Number of competing 
private railway firms 
18 0.111 
(0.323) 




Number of stops/distance 18 0.026 
(0.015) 












Panel B: Comparison by Change (between 1976 and 1986) 
User cost per distance 


















    



























Notes: Standard deviations and standard errors are given in parentheses and square brackets, respectively. “Imperfectly 
substitutable with CR” is the dummy for stations that are imperfectly substitutable with the conventional railway. 
 
The following Table 2-4 summarize the main characteristics of the sample. As showed, 
the average time cost for all the OD pairs in the sample is 42.14 minutes. The details of other 






Table 2–4 Summary Statistics of Empirical Variables 
Variables N. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
User cost      
Time cost (minutes) 144 42.14 15.48 19.04 86.32 
Monetary cost (Japanese yen) 144 2,110.00 1,142.54 700.00 4,930.00 
Time-variant controls      
Log of population  
(city/ward level) 
144 12.86 1.78 10.58 15.97 
Log of total income  
(prefecture level) 
144 7.75 0.54 6.74 8.46 
Number of stops 144 1.79 0.99 1.00 5.00 
Time-invariant controls      
Treatment group dummy 36 0.50 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Distance 36 69.95 37.41 16.10 152.50 
Number of competing private 
railway firms 
36 0.33 0.68 0.00 2.00 
Imperfectly substitutable with CR 36 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
 
2.3 Empirical Results 
2.3.1 Effect of Railway Market Competition on HSR Service 
We investigate the effect of market competition on passengers’ time cost by HSR, which with 
results showed in the following Table 2-5. Specifications in Table 2-5 include OD and year 
fixed effects, as well the time-variant variables10. Estimated result in Columns (1) are through 
basic specifications, and result shows that time cost was significantly lower by 4.167 minutes 
on average for OD pairs in duopoly area where HSR is competing with conventional rail, 
relative to OD pairs in monopoly region. This result is robust in terms of additional control by 
the interaction term between time-invariant variables and post1987 dummy as showed in column 
                                                 
10 The time variant control variables include (ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the destination city), ln(real income in the 





(3). Result in Column (3) shows that market competition significantly reduces the time cost for 
OD pairs in duopoly region by 3.246 minutes on average, when comparing with OD pairs in 
monopoly area. 
Different from Column (1) and (3), interaction term of duopoly with distance is 
additionally included in Column (2) and (4). Based on Column (2), Column (4) additionally 
controls interaction term between time-invariant variables and post1987 dummy. Estimate 
results in Column (2) and (4) show that time cost is significantly lower by 4.084 minutes and 
3.487 minutes on average in duopoly area, relative to monopoly region, respectively. Different 
from the estimate for interaction term of duopoly with distance which seems to be insignificant 
in Column (2), namely we do not find any evidence; while in Column (4), coefficient for 
interaction term of duopoly with distance is -0.065 (significant at 1% level) after controlling 
interaction term of time-invariant variables with post1987 dummy. Therefore, all these results 
consistently show that market competition significantly reduce passengers’ time cost by around 
4 minutes on average for OD pairs in duopoly region, when comparing with that in the 
monopoly region. 
 
Table 2–5 Effect of Duopoly on Time Cost 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 












OD and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-invariant controls× Post1987 No No Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.646 0.656 0.693 0.722 
 
Note: (a) This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). All standard errors in the square brackets are 
collected for dyadic correlation. Triple asterisks (***) denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level. (b) 
Time-variant controls include ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the destination city), ln(real income in the 
origin prefecture), ln(real income in the destination prefecture), the number of stops, and year fixed effects. Time-invariant 
controls are distance, the number of competing private railway companies, and dummy for stations that are imperfectly 





we standardize the distance so that the mean of “Duopoly × Distance” is equal to zero for ease of interpretation of the 
coefficient estimate of “Duopoly”, i.e., the coefficient is the average treatment effect of duopoly. 
2.3.2 Robustness Checks 
2.3.2.1 Robustness Check: Unbalanced Variables’ Influences 
As showed in Table 2-3, population in duopoly regions is significantly larger than that in 
monopoly regions. As mentioned, this is reasonable since big cities like Tokyo and Osaka all 
located in duopoly regions, relative to smaller cities with fewer population in monopoly 
regions. Besides, as showed in Table 2-3, the number of competing private railway firms in 
duopoly regions is significantly larger than in monopoly regions. This is due to the duopoly 
regions are with higher population which create more travelling demand. More demand always 
comes with more providers, namely, railway firms. Therefore, difference in population and 
number of competing private railway firms between duopoly and monopoly regions could be  
confounders in the analysis results.  
As a further robustness check, the interaction term between duopoly and population in 
1976 in log and the interaction term between duopoly and number of competing private 
companies are separately taken for analysis in Column (1) and (2). In Column (3), both 
interaction term between duopoly and population in 1976 in log and interaction term between 
duopoly and number of competing private companies are used for estimate in column (3). For 
all the columns in Table 2-6, OD and year fixed effects, time variant variables, the interaction 
term between time-invariant variables and post1987 dummy and interaction term between 
duopoly with distance are all included. All the estimate results in Table 2-6 consistently show 
that market competition reduce passengers’ time cost by around 3.5 minutes on average for 
OD pairs in duopoly area, relative to those in monopoly area. In the Columns of Table 2-6, the 
coefficient for interaction term of duopoly with distance is consistently around -0.067 
(significant at 1% level). Besides, as obviously showed in Column (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2-
6, no evidences show that population and number of competing private railway firms have 






Table 2–6 Examining the Influences of Unbalanced Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
















Duopoly × Number of competing 





OD and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time-invariant controls× Post1987 Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.723 0.723 0.723 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). All standard errors in the square brackets 
are corrected for dyadic correlation. Triple asterisks (***) denote that coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. (2) 
Additional controls are the same as in column 4 of Table 2-5 (see the note in Table 2-5). 
2.3.2.2 Robustness check: Heterogeneity between East and JR West 
We also conduct robustness check on the heterogeneity between JR East and JR West. In 
Column (1) and (2) of Table 2-7, the market competition effect is investigated by region with 
the effect varies according to distance by region. Different from Column (1) which use 
interaction term between duopoly with distance, Column (2) include triple interaction between 
duopoly, distance and the company dummies (the company dummy that which JR company 
provides conventional service against HSR service provided by JR Central). In both Column 
(1) and (2), OD and year fixed effects, time-variant variables and interaction between time-
invariant variables and post1987 dummy are all included.  
As showed in Column (1) and (2), effect of market competition in the region where JR 
East competes with JR Central, namely Tokyo region, reduces time cost by 3.562 minutes and 
3.448 minutes on average (significant at 1% level), respectively, relative to monopoly region; 





region, reduces time cost by 3.170 minutes and 2.789 minutes on average (significant at 1% 
level), respectively, relatively to monopoly region. As showed in Column (1), the coefficient 
of the interaction term for duopoly with distance is -0.065 (significant at 1% level); in Column 
(2), the coefficients of triple interaction between duopoly, distance and JR East and triple 
interaction between duopoly, distance and JR West are -0.057 and -0.090, respectively (both 
significant at 1% level). Overall, all these estimate results consistently show that impact of 
market competition in the region where JR East provides conventional rail service and in the 
region where JR West provides conventional rail service is at same level with significance level 
at 1%, while the impact of market competition on time cost in the region that JR East competes 
with JR Central is a bit larger than that in the region where JR West competes with JR Central. 
 
Table 2–7 Checks on the Heterogenous Trends between JR East and JR West 
 (1) (2) 








Duopoly × Distance -0.065*** 
[0.011] 
 
Duopoly × Distance × JR East  -0.057*** 
[0.010] 
Duopoly × Distance × JR West  -0.090*** 
[0.016] 
OD and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes 
Time-invariant controls × Post1987 Yes Yes 
F test for the null hypothesis that (a) and (b): F(1,13) = 0.63 2.59 
Observations 144 144 
R-squared 0.723 0.726 
 
Notes: (1) This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). All standard errors in the square brackets 
are corrected for dyadic correlation. Triple asterisks (***) denote that coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. (2) 





2.3.2.3 Robustness Check: Privatization or Other Trends? 
Different from all other tables which focus on changes after JNR privatization in 1987, in 
Columns of Table 2-8, interaction term between treatment dummy and post1977 dummy and 
interaction term between treatment and post1997 dummy are also included to investigate whether 
there are some other trends instead of the privatization. No clear evidences are found by the 
interaction term between treatment dummy and post1977 dummy and interaction term between 
treatment dummy and post1997 dummy. However, coefficients for interaction between 
treatment dummy and post1987 dummy are -3.226 (significant at 5% level), -3.584 (significant 
at 1% level) and -3.555 (significant at 1% level) as showed in Column (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively.  
Different from Column (1), Column (2) includes interaction term between duopoly 
dummy and distance, and the coefficient is -0.058 (significant at 1% level). In Column (3), 
based on Column (2), triple interaction term between treatment dummy, post1977 dummy and 
distance, and triple interaction term between treatment dummy, post1997 dummy and distance 
are included. No clear evidences are found for effect of triple interaction term between 
treatment dummy, post1977 dummy and distance, and triple interaction term between treatment 
dummy, post1997 dummy and distance. However, coefficient for interaction between duopoly 
dummy and distance in Column (3) is -0.093 (significant at 1% level), which is larger than that 
estimate result in Column (2). Overall, all these show the impact of market competition is 







Table 2–8 Privatization or Other Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) 


















Treatment × Post1977 × Distance   0.029 
[0.034] 




Treatment × Post1997 × Distance   0.038 
[0.024] 
OD and Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls × Post dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.755 0.777 0.787 
 
Note: (a) This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). All standard errors in the square brackets are 
corrected for dyadic correlation. Triple and double asterisks (*** and **) denote that the coefficient is statistically at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. (b) Additional controls are the same as in column 4 of Table 2-5 (see the notes in Table 2-5). 
 
As an additional evidence, treatment effects by distance are showed in the following 
Figure 2-3. No clear evidences are showed through the interaction between treatment dummy 
and post1977 dummy and the interaction between treatment dummy and post1997 dummy. 
However, as showed in the (b) of Figure 2-3, the market competition effect after JNR 
privatization in 1987 significantly reduce time cost for OD pairs in duopoly area, relative to 
monopoly area. Besides, the market competition effect is larger for longer distance trip, 
especially for distance larger than 60km (significant at 5% level). In the sample for analysis, 











































2.3.3 Additional Robustness Checks and Theoretical Analysis 
2.3.3.1 Examining the Influence of Nozomi Supper Express 
Some more additional robustness checks are taken as showed in Appendix A. In the Table A2-
1, it examines the influence of Nozomi super express. On the Tokyo-Osaka route, there are 
three types of HSR trains, Nozomi, Hikari and Kodama. Among them, Nozomi is a supper 
express HSR that only stop major stations11 and mainly compete with the air transport. Since 
large demand exist these major stations, it may confound with our outcome and that is why we 
conduct the robustness check by considering whether Nozomi stops at the origin station of the 
OD pair or Nozomi train direct connects both cities of the OD pair. 
 The impact of market competition is investigated in all column of Table A2-1, with the 
market competition effect by distance estimated in column (2) and (4). Different from only 
take control for Nozomi stop in column (1) and (2), column (3) and (4) additionally take control 
for Nozomi train direct connects the OD pair. Overall, the estimate results show that after 
taking consider of Nozomi effect, the impact of market competition is still significant at same 
level, which is market competition reduces the time cost for OD pairs in duopoly region by 
around 3 minutes on average (significant at 1% level), relative to monopoly region. Besides, 
the impact of market competition increases when distance increase, namely the impact is 
stronger for longer distance trip. 
2.3.3.2 Additional Robustness Check by Distribution of Target Times 
The following Figure 2-4 shows the distribution of passenger volume over time within a day. 
Apparently, there exist two typical peak time periods. Therefore, robustness check by taking 
the weight of passenger distribution at each time period as showed in Table A2 as showed in 




                                                 


















Notes: Number of passengers on non-reserved-seat cars of a Hikari Super Express between Odawara and Shizuoka in 
October 1989. 22-24 O’clock values are extrapolated by second-order approximation. Source: Ministry of Transportation, 
Japan. 
 
Different from other analysis, which simply use the mean of actual time cost for all 
available target arrival times for each OD pair, the analysis in column (2) in Table A2-2 take 
the average of actual time cost with the weight by the share of passenger volume. After taken 
the weight, the coefficient is still almost same value with significance level at 1%. Overall, the 
distribution of passenger volume is not one of the main factors that influence the time cost.  
2.3.3.3 Robustness Checks on Statistical Robustness with Dyadic Correlation 
Results for checks on statistical robustness are showed in Table A2-3 in appendix A by using 
different kinds of cluster variables and different type of clustering method. To check the 
reliability of our variance estimator and the statistical robustness of our results, we compute 
standard errors under several different correlation assumptions. As can be seen from the Table 
A2-3, our standard errors are slightly larger than those based on alternative correlation 
assumptions except the Leave-one-node-out Jackknife clustering method. The reason for 
conducting this robustness check is mainly because the number of nodes (stations) is in this 
study is not large enough and a larger fraction of elements in the error correlation matrix are 
nonzero.  





2.3.3.4 Theoretical Analysis: Market Structure and Travel Time of Parallel Railways 
In the appendix B, it constructs a situation with two types of train services in parallel, but in 
difference conditions, namely duopoly and monopoly. Given the condition that the price 
regulated, for the same trip, time cost for the passengers’ in duopoly condition with market 
competition is less than that in monopoly condition. Besides, in the case of symmetric parallel 
railway which with a situation that both price and the speed of railways are endogenous 
determined, through the analysis in appendix B, we yield that time cost in duopoly is less than 
in monopoly. 
2.4  Conclusions 
This study investigated the impact of market competition on passengers’ time cost by HSR. 
When Japan National Railways (JNR) was privatized into six regionally monopolistic railway 
cooperation in 1987, there emerged exceptional areas where the industrial structure of railway 
transportation happened to be duopolistic due to separation of high-speed and conventional 
rails. Leveraging on this nature experimental setting arising from the privatization of JNR, we 
conducted a difference-in-difference approach to estimate whether the change in speed and 
scheduling of HSR has made user worse off in the segments where HSR and conventional rail 
competes with each other, after the privatization and regional separation of JNR in 1987. The 
results showed that the increased competition by duopoly decreases the HSR time cost by 
around 4 minutes on average, namely around 10% of average travel time for OD pairs, relative 
to monopoly, while the speed of Shinkansen only increased by 21% in last 50 years. Besides, 












Appendix A  Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Table A 2-1 Examining the Influence of Nozomi Supper Express 
 (1)  (2)  （3） （4） 
Duopoly 
(Treatment × Post1987) 






  -3.364*** 
[0.692] 
Duopoly × Distance  -0.065*** 
[0.012] 
  -0.072*** 
[0.015] 
OD and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-invariant controls × 
Post1987    
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nozomi stop station × Post1987 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nozomi direct link OD × Post1987 No No Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.693 0.723 0.695 0.724 
 
Notes: This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). Except additional include the interaction term 
between Nozomi stop station with Post1987 dummy, other specifications in this Column (1) is the same with that in Column 














Table A 2-2 Additional Robustness Check by Distribution of Target Times 
 (1) (Col.4 of Table 2-5) (2)  
Treatment × Post1987  
(Duopoly) 








Weight No # of passengers 
OD and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes Yes 
Time-invariant controls × Post1987    Yes Yes 
Observations 144 144 
R-squared 0.722 0.710 
 
Notes: This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). Additional controls are the  

















Table A 2-3 Checks on Statistical Robustness 
 Coefs. (1) (Col.4 of 
Table 2-5) 
(2)  （3） （4） 
Duopoly 
(Treatment × Post1987) 
-3.487 [0.719]*** [1.266]*** [0.661]*** [0.516]*** 
Duopoly × Distance -0.065 [0.012]*** [0.031]** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** 
Cluster variable(s)  Origin ID 
& destination 
Station ID Origin ID & 
Destination ID 
Entity  
(OD pair) ID 




OD and year fixed 
effects 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-invariant 
controls × Post1987 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: (a) This table reports only the coefficient of interest based on equation (1). All standard errors in the square brackets 
are corrected for dyadic correlation. Triple and double asterisks (*** and **) denote that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. (b) Additional controls are the same as in Column 4 of Table 5 (see the notes 
















Appendix B  Market Structure and Travel Time of Parallel Railways  
We here illustrate a situation where monopoly increases the users’ time cost under a plausible 
setting. Let us suppose there are two types of train services in parallel denoted by i = 1, 2. 
Demand of type i train service is a function of its own price as well as that of another:  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗) 
for i ≠ j ∈ {1,2}, where is 𝑄𝑖 the demand and 𝑃𝑖 is the price of the type i train. Here, 𝑄𝑖𝑖  = 
𝜕𝑄𝑖 / 𝜕𝑃𝑖 < 0 and since railways are substitutive 𝑄𝑖𝑗  = 𝜕𝑄𝑖 / 𝜕𝑃𝑗 > 0. For simplicity we assume 
𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑗= 0.  
Price is consisted of two parts, namely, ticket price is 𝑓𝑖 and user’s time cost is 𝑡𝑖, hence: 
                                                                     𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖       for i = 1, 2. 
Time cost 𝑡𝑖 of the type i train determines the amount of required investment 𝐾𝐼(𝑡𝑖). We 
assume 𝐾𝑖 > 0, 𝐾𝑖′ < 0 and 𝐾𝑖′′ is positive and monotonic. Duopoly owns either type while 
monopoly owns both types of train services. Then duopolist’s problem is to maximize its profit 
with respect to ticket price 𝑓𝑖 and time cost 𝑡𝑖 which can be written as: 
max
𝑓𝑖,𝑡𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗) - 𝐾𝑖(𝑡𝑖),    
s.t. 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖 
Given 𝑃𝑗 for i ≠ j ∈ {1, 2}. The first-order conditions are: 
𝑄𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖  = 0 
𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖) = 0 
where we define 𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝑄𝑖 / 𝜕𝑃𝑖 < 0.  
Let 𝑡𝑖𝐷 and 𝑓𝑖𝐷 be the solution to the above and let 𝑃𝑖𝐷 =  𝑡𝑖𝐷 + 𝑓𝑖𝐷.  







𝜋1 + 𝜋2 
and the corresponding first-order conditions are:  
𝑄𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖= 0 
𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖  +𝑓𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖) = 0 
for i ≠ j ∈ {1,2}. Let 𝑡𝑖𝑀 and 𝑓𝑖𝑀 be the solution to the above and let 𝑃𝑖𝑀 = 𝑡𝑖𝑀+𝑓𝑖𝑀. We can 
rewrite these first-order conditions by using a parameter δ ∈ {0, 1}:  
𝑄𝑖  = −𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖) 
                                                        𝑓𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑖+ δ𝑓𝑗𝐷𝑖
𝑗= 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖)                    (1)  
as δ = 0 corresponds to duopoly and δ = 1 to monopoly.  
Travel time under price regulation  
Suppose for now that the fare is effectively restricted as in our context. Then duopolist’s 
profit- maximization problem becomes  
              max
𝑡𝑖
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗) - 𝐾𝑖(𝑡𝑖),    𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑃𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑖 
which further yields the first-order condition as:  
𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖𝐷) for i = 1, 2. 
We assume that the second-order condition is globally satisfied implying that 𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖  
< 𝐾𝑖′′.12 In turn, monopolist’s problem is now simply: 
max 
𝑡1,𝑡2
(𝜋1 + 𝜋2) 
                                                 





and the corresponding first-order conditions are: 
𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖𝑀)       for i ≠ j ∈ {1,2}.  
The fact that 𝑓𝑗𝑄𝑗𝑖 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝐾𝑖′′, along with 𝐾𝑖′ < 0 yields: 
𝑡𝑀 >  𝑡𝐷. 
A case of symmetric parallel railways  
Here, we consider a situation where both price and the speed of railways–i.e. the time cost–are 
endogenously determined. For analytical tractability we specify the demand and investment 
functions assuming symmetry between the two parallel railways as follows:  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑎0 − 𝑎1𝑃𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑃𝑗 




For i ≠ j ∈ {1,2}, with all parameters being positive, and 𝑎1 > 𝑎2. Then the first order 
conditions (1) imply: 
 𝑎0 + (𝑎2 − 𝑎1)(𝑡 + 𝑓) = 𝑘1 − 𝑘2𝑡 
                     (𝑎1−δ𝑎2)f = 𝑘1 − 𝑘2𝑡 
where, by symmetry we let t = 𝑡𝑖 and f =𝑓𝑖  for both i = 1,2. Solving these gives the time cost t 
as a continuous function of δ:  
𝑡 ( 𝛿 )  =
       (𝑘1 −  𝑎0)(𝑎1 −  𝛿𝑎2) + (𝑎1 − 𝑎2) 𝑘1      
(𝑘2 −  𝑎1 + 𝑎2)(𝑎1 −  𝛿𝑎2) + (𝑎1 − 𝑎2) 𝑘2 
 
This generate 𝑡𝑀 =  𝑡 (1)  and 𝑡𝐷 =  𝑡 (0)  
Hence: 






Using continuity of 𝑡 ( 𝛿 ) with respect to 𝛿 rewrites the above as: 
𝑡𝑀 − 𝑡𝐷 = ∫ 𝑡′ (10 𝛿 )𝑑𝛿 
𝑡′( 𝛿 ) =  {𝑎2(𝑎1 −  𝑎2)[𝑎0𝑘2 − (𝑎1 −  𝑎2) 𝑘1 ]} 𝑔−2  
and g = (𝑘2 − 𝑎1 + 𝑎2) (𝑎1 −  𝛿𝑎2) +  (𝑎1 −  𝑎2)𝑘2. 
 
Now, 𝐾𝑖′(𝑡𝑖) < 0 implies t < 𝑘1/𝑘2 which further implies that:  
 𝑎0𝑘2  − (𝑎1 − 𝑎2)𝑘1 > 0 
 
This, together with 𝑎1 > 𝑎2 > 0, yields: 






3. Market competition Effect on Passengers by Conventional Rail 
3.1. Introduction 
As already mentioned in the introduction part of Chapter 2, a number of studies investigated 
either the correlated relationship or casual inference between market competition and 
service/product quality. Many studies find that competition improves service/product quality 
(Mazzeo, 2003; Greenfield, 2014; Pan, 2015; Bergman, 2016;). Some papers show the negative 
effect of competition on service quality. Propper et al. (2004) estimated the relationship 
between competition and quality of care in UK health care market through least squares 
regressions and found the relationship was to be negative, while the estimated effect was quite 
small. Forder and Allan (2014) found that higher competition pushed down quality in English 
care homes market through instrumental variable (IV) estimations, while the lower quality was 
due to decrease in price instead of competition. Lahiri and Ono (1988) found that by 
eliminating or impairing minor firms, a government can actually increase welfare. 
This study investigates the impact of market competition between CR and HSR transport 
service on passengers’ time cost by using CR. Same with the estimation method used in 
Chapter 2, this study also use difference-in-differences (DID) approach by comparing 
passengers’ time cost on certain origin-destination (OD) pair before and after 1987. The data 
was also collected from timetables published in four different years under by same company-
Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) Foundation. The two years before 1987 are year 1976 and 1986, 
and the other two years after 1987 are year 1996 and 2006. In this research, only local & rapid 
trains that just need base fare are included. Table 3-1 shows the different types of CR services 
on the Tokyo-Osaka route that are provided by JR companies.  
Table 3–1 Different Types of Conventional Rail Services 
Train type Base fare  Express fee  Stops 
Local Need No need Every station 
Rapid  Need No need Less than local, but more than express 
Express Need Express fee Less than rapid, more than limited express 
Limited Express  Need Limited 
Express fee 
Only stop at main stations 





As already mentioned in Chapter 2, due to heavy deficits, JNR, a state-owned public 
corporation, was divided into six railway companies for transporting passengers after April 1, 
1987. Each of them is in charge of CR and parallelly-running HSR services in certain region 
except Shinkoku region with HSR service. For the busy Tokyo-Osaka route, CR service is 
provided by three different companies. CR service between Tokyo and Atami is provided by 
JR East; between Atami and Maibara, it is provided by JR Central; and between Maibara and 
Osaka, it is provided by JR West. However, HSR service on the Tokyo-Osaka route is provided 
only by JR Central. Therefore, CR and HSR on the Tokyo-Atami route and the Maibara-Osaka 
route compete with each other, since they belong to different companies. As both CR and HSR 
services are provided by JR Central on the Atami-Maibara route, rail transport service is in 
monopoly. These conform the research design of this study, for measuring the difference in the 
impact of duopoly and monopoly, before and after JNR’s privatization. 
CR service on the Tokyo-Osaka route existed for many years, before HSR service first 
parallelly operated in 1964. CR provides low-cost transport services that compete with HSR in 
some regions. Even though no CR provides direct transport service for the Tokyo-Osaka route, 
the trip can be easily completed through transfers. When comparing with HSR, CR has some 
disadvantages, such as more time cost and unavoidable transfers. As CR’s speed is just half of 
HSR’s and it needs transfer time, time cost of travelling through CR is more than twice of HSR 
(shown in Table 3-2). Fortunately, the selection of transfer stations is flexible, and transfer is 
convenient, without the need to get out of the stations. Therefore, CR has its advantages with 
disadvantages, when compared to HSR. 
Table 3–2 CR V.S HSR (Between Tokyo Station and Shin-Osaka Station, Year 1982) 







CR 552.6km More than 9h 3 6,600 Less than HSR 
HSR 552.6km 3h10min 0 11,000     80 
 
Note: Here CR just considers the non-reserved seat service which only cost base fare.  
Ticket price for HSR here is price of non-reserved seat which is the base fare.   





3.2. Literature Review 
As competition is important in a market system, many economists are interested in analyzing 
the effect of market competition. Previous studies have discussed about the impact of market 
competition, especially theoretical works (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Perry and Porter, 
1985; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987; Maskin and Tirole, 1988; Hsu, et al., 2010; Matsa, 2011; 
Xia and Zhang, 2016; Tsunoda, 2018;) and empirical studies which investigate the relationship 
between market competition and service or product quality (Propper, et al., 2004; Greenfield, 
2014; Pan, et al., 2015;). However, only a few empirical studies discuss the causal inference of 
market competition on service quality.  
Among the limited empirical studies that estimate causal inference of market competition, 
most of them investigate the effect of competition on health care services (Forder and Allan, 
2014; Bergman, et al., 2016;) and the impact of competition between HSR and airlines 
(Albalate, 2015; Wan, et al., 2016; Zhang, et al., 2017). Empirical literatures exist for other 
industries, such as education industry (Hoxby, 2000;), manufacturing industry (Tang and Wang, 
2005;), supermarket industry (Bonanno and Lopez, 2009;) and while their number is less. 
Besides, many of them are not perfect in research design since they analyze the problem 
without observation fixed effect, existing reverse causality or confounders. As panel data in 
this study is analyzed with year and OD fixed effects and taken consideration for heterogeneity, 
it can be a better way for examining the impact of competition in transportation field, where 
randomized experiment is almost impossible.  
Almost all the studies that discuss about competition between HSR and CR use theoretic 
approach for analysis. Hsu et al. (2010) analyzed competition and cooperation between HSR 
and CR by studying two roughly-parallel rail systems in Taiwan, although they just used game 
theoretical approach and the data used to test their models was only one year. Raturi and Verma 
(2013) used game theoretical approach to analyze the impact of HSR introduction and used 
passengers’ time cost and monetary cost data to analyze the sensitivity of equilibrium state, 
although only simulation data was used. Different from these theoretical studies, this study 
randomly generates different target arrival time (TAT), collects time cost data for them from 
published JR timetables, and then takes average as time cost for each origin-destination (OD) 
pair. This study proceeds by using panel data and difference-in-differences approach to analyze 





transportation industry and is closely related to quality of daily lives, it is necessary to carry 
out this research. 
3.3. Identification strategy  
As described in introduction part, rail transport services for Tokyo-Atami and Maibara-Osaka 
routes changed from monopoly to duopoly after 1987, and all the OD pairs on these two routes 
are included in the treatment group; rail services for Atami-Maibara route is in monopoly for 
all the years, and all the OD pairs on this route are included in control group. To estimate the 
effect of changes in market competition between the treatment and control groups, this study 
uses difference-in-differences (DID) approach as identification strategy which is the same with 
the method used in the study in Chapter 2. 
This study estimates the impact of market competition along with year and OD pair fixed 
effects by using four years data (1976, 1986, 1996, 2006). By using year and OD pair fixed 
effects, it can eliminate omitted variable bias. DID approach measure the average treatment 
effect as a difference between the changes in the outcome variable of treatment and control 
groups over the same period.  
Basic DID model in this study is as follows:  
                                     𝑌𝑖𝑡 = β(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡)  +γ𝑋𝑖𝑡+ ϕ𝑖 + φ𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      (2) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 as outcome variable and it is time cost for directional OD pair i in year t in this study, 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a treated-group dummy that takes a value of one if OD pair is located on the Tokyo-
Atami route and the Maibara-Osaka route and zero otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a after treatment year 
(1987) dummy, and it equals to 1 if the year is 1996 and 2006, and 0 otherwise. ϕ𝑖 and φ𝑡 are 
OD and year fixed effects, respectively. β is the estimator of treatment effect in this study. 
Variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables which depend on model specification. Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is 






3.4.1. Data Sources  
Time cost data used in this research for all the four years are collected from JR timetables 
published by Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) Foundation. Other variables include: (1) Population 
data collected from Japanese national survey (Kokusei Chosa, every five years one time). For 
year 1976, this study uses year 1975 survey data; for year 1986, this study uses year 1985 
survey data; for year 1996, this study uses year 1995 survey data; and for year 2006, this study 
uses year 2005 survey data; (2) Per capita income data from Japanese central government 
website (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan); (3) GDP deflator from World Bank national 
accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files; (4) Number of stops means the number 
of conventional rail stations between origin and destination stations for each OD pair and is 
collected from the JR timetables published by JTB Foundation; (5) The number of private 
railway firms that compete with JR company for same OD pair (from JR companies). 
3.4.2. Details about the data 
In this research, unit of analysis is directional origin-destination (OD) station pair within each 
region (three regions in total). Therefore, two kinds of OD pairs exist in this research: one kind 
is where both origin and destination stations are on either Tokyo-Atami route or Maibara-
Osaka route which makes up the treatment group; the other kind is where both origin and 
destination stations are on Atami-Maibara route which is set as our control group.  
Stations that included in this study are the stations which provide both HSR and CR 
services for all the four years (details are shown in the following Table 3-3). Therefore, the 
stations without HSR service or established after year 1976 are not included in our analysis. 
As shown in Table 3-3, the maximum distance for OD pairs in the control group (341.3 km) is 
nearly three times that of the maximum distance for OD pairs in treatment group (110.5 km). 
To keep the balance, in this study, we pick up the OD pairs in control group which near the 
borders (Atami and Nagoya) and within the maximum distance of OD pairs in the treatment 
group (110.5km). As shown in Table 3-3, 12 OD pairs in the control group with 18 OD pairs 






Table 3–3 OD Pairs in the Analysis for One Year 




Number of OD Pairs Near Borders 
and Within 110.5km 
1.Treatment Group    
Tokyo-Atami 12 104.6 12 
Maibara-Osaka 6 110.5 6 
Total 18 110.5 18 
2.Control Group    
Atami-Maibara 56 341.3 12 
All 74 341.3 30 
 
Note: Stations between Tokyo and Osaka included in this research are: Tokyo, Yokohama (Shin-Yokohama for HSR), 
Odawara and Atami, Mishima, Shizuoka, Hamamatsu, Toyohashi, Gifu (Gifu-hashima for HSR), Maibara, Kyoto and 
Osaka (Shin-Osaka for HSR). As Atami and Maibara station are boundary stations, they are considered in charged by JR 
companies on both sides. 
 
In this study, time cost consists of in-vehicle time and schedule delay. In-vehicle time is 
the time difference between train’s actual arrival time and actual departure time (both 
available in published timetables); schedule delay is the time gap between target arrival time 
and actual arrival time. Target arrival time are 50 randomly generated time points between 
6:00 and 24:00 pm in this study and actual arrival time is available in published timetables. 
For each target arrival time, the train that minimizes time cost is selected and recorded for all 
OD pairs. Average of the time cost for all target arrival time is generated as final time cost for 
each OD pair in each year. As delay in arrival is supposed to be not allowed in this study, 
schedule delay in this research is schedule delay early (not schedule delay late). Besides, CR 
services included in this study are non-reserved seats and without express fee. Seasonal trains 





3.5 Results and Interpretations 
3.5.1 Summary Statistics 
In Table 3-4, it shows that the average time cost for all the OD pairs used in this study is 74.68 
minutes. Besides, other information for time-variant and time-invariant control variables are 
shown there as well. 
Table 3–4 Summary Statistics of Empirical Variables 
Variables Observations Mean Standard 
Deviations 
Min Max 
Time cost (minutes) 120 74.68 32.56 24.03  140.67 
Time-variant Controls      
Log of Population 
(City/Ward Level) 
120 12.92 1.89 10.58 15.97 
Log of Income per Capita  
(Prefecture Level) 
120 7.76 0.54 6.74 8.46 
Number of Stops 120 11 6.37 1 26 
Time-invariant Controls      
Treatment Group Dummy 30 0.60 0.50 0 1 
Number of Competing Private  
Railway Companies 
30 0.40 0.72 0 2 
 
Note: Treatment group dummy is 1, if OD pair is located in treatment group (OD pairs on Tokyo-Atami and Maibara-
Osaka route), otherwise it is 0. Number of competing private railway companies is the number of private railways that  
do not belong to JR but provide transport service for the OD pairs. 
3.5.2 Balance Check 
To verify the validity of common trend assumption, balancing test of baseline characteristics 
was executed as showed in the following Table 3-5. Table 3-5 presents the balance checks of 
baseline characteristics between OD pairs in monopoly and duopoly areas for the years before 





Table 3–5 Balancing Test of Baseline Characteristics 
 Control Group Treatment Group (2) - (4) 






 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 











Other characteristics       
Population/10,000 24 52.504 
(73.89) 




Income per Capita 24 1,658.734 
(773.155) 












Number of Competing 
Private Rail Firms 
12 0.167 
(0.389) 






























Change in Number of 
Competing Private Rail 
Firms/Capita in Million 
12 -0.002 
(0.006) 





Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses and standard errors are given in square bracket. Significant differences 
are indicated as: * means p value<0.1, **means p value<0.05, *** means p value <0.01.  
 
As shown in Panel A in Table 3-5, the mean of time cost per distance in control group is 





speed difference that affects in-vehicle time or frequency difference that affects schedule delay 
early. Besides, population in treatment group is significantly higher than population in control 
group at 1% significance level. This is because Tokyo, Yokohama and Osaka stations (in 
treatment group) all located in big cities. Population of these cities are much higher when 
compared with population of cities that OD pairs in control group (Atami-Maibara) are located. 
As for per capita income and number of stops per distance, there is no significant difference 
among the treatment and control group. As shown in Table 3-5, the number of competing 
private firms in treatment group is higher than that in control group at 10% significant level. 
This is reasonable as OD pairs in treatment group are located in Tokyo and Osaka regions and 
have relatively higher passengers’ volume along with more private rail firms that compete with 
JR companies.  
Panel B of Table 3-5 shows the changes between year 1976 and 1986 in treatment and 
control group. It is necessary to check whether the changes between treatment group and 
control group is balanced before treatment, which is a common trend assumption in this study. 
The results show that there are no significant differences in the change of time cost per distance, 
population, per capita income and the number of competing private rail firms per million capita 
among treatment and control group between year 1976 and 1986. Since the number of 
competing private rail firms in this study does not change over the years, the number of 
competing private rail firms per million capita is used as an alternative. All these prove that the 







3.5.3 Effect of Market Competition on Conventional Rail  
Table 3–6 Reduced Form Regressions of Time Cost (Duopoly Effect) 
 (1) (2) (3) 






OD and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time-variant Controls No Yes Yes 
Time-invariant Controls × Post 
Dummies 
No No Yes 
Observations 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.804 0.849 0.868 
 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors for undirectional OD pairs are showed in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Time-variant controls include ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the destination city), ln(real income per 
capita in the origin prefecture), ln(real income per capita in the destination prefecture) and number of stops between each 
OD pair. Time-invariant controls include the number of competing private railway companies. 
The result of the OD and year fixed effects analysis in row (1) of Table 3-6 shows that 
market competition leads to an increment in time cost for the treatment group by 5.573 minutes 
when comparing with the change of time cost in control group, but it is not statistically 
significant. The row (2) shows the regression result after additional including time-variant 
controls. The reduced form regressions result in row (2) show that coefficient of duopoly is 
3.790, which means market competition leads to an increment of time cost in treatment group 
by 3.790 minutes on an average when comparing with the change of time cost in control group, 
but it is still not statistically significant. The row (3) shows regression result after additionally 
including Time-invariant controls × Post dummies. Reduced form regressions result shows that 
the coefficient of duopoly is 2.968, which means market competition leads to an increment of 
time cost in treatment group by 2.968 minutes on an average when comparing with the change 
of time cost in control group, but it is not statistically significant as well.  
Base on the model used in row (3) of Table 3-6, another specification by using cross term 
between Treatment dummy and Year is used for additional analysis. Therefore, Treatment × 





Post 1987, and analysis result is shown in Table 3-7. As shown in Table 3-7, coefficients of 
treatment effect in 1986, 1996 and 2006 are 2.413, 3.559 and -3.119, respectively. But all of 
them are not statistically significant. Therefore, no statistically significant treatment effect is 
found on passengers’ time cost in treatment group. 
 
Table 3–7 Reduced Form Regressions of Time Cost (Duopoly Effect) 
 (4) 
Treatment × Year 1986 2.413 
[3.211] 
Treatment × Year 1996 3.559 
[3.217] 
Treatment × Year 2006 -3.119 
[1.879] 
OD and year fixed effects Yes 
Time-variant controls Yes 




Note: Clustered robust standard errors for undirectional OD pairs are showed in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Time-variant controls include ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the destination city), ln(real income per capita 
in the origin prefecture), ln(real income per capita in the destination prefecture) and number of stops between each OD pair. 
Time-invariant controls include the number of competing private railway companies. Treatment × Year 1986 is the cross term 
between treatment dummy and year 1986. Treatment × Year 1996 is the cross term between treatment dummy and year 1996. 
Treatment × Year 2006 is the cross term between treatment dummy and year 2006. 
3.5.4 Discussion 
Regression results in Table 3-6 show that market competition after JR privatization in 1987 led 
to an increment of time cost in the treatment group when comparing with change of time cost 
in control group, but it is not statistically significant. After using the Treatment × Year 
specification used in the analysis of Table 3-7, we still could not find any statistically 





from this empirical analysis, theoretical analysis of market competition on passengers’ time 
cost by CR is shown in the Appendix C. There exist following three possible reasons for why 
above empirical analysis results are different from the theoretical analysis results showed in 
the Appendix C. 
First of all, after privatization of JNR in 1987, JR Central improved its CR transport 
service (by either speed or frequency) on the entire route they were in charge of, rather than 
only improving services around Nagoya station. After the privatization in 1987, JR Central 
replaced the trains it inherited from JNR by new type of trains on whole route (not just around 
Nagoya) and until 2006, 80% percentage of its local trains was replaced by the new types of 
trains. The new type of trains has characteristics like larger maximum speed, acceleration and 
deceleration. Since JR Central used new type of trains, its conventional rail transport service 
could get much improvement in its service like speed and then have potential to increase 
frequency (link showed in References). Besides, JR Central actually reduced the trains 
frequency for some low demand route and increased the frequency for the busy lines it in 
charged to obtain more profit (link showed in References).  
Second, CR services in the regions which were going to be in charged by JR East company 
and JR West companies probably already got improved before 1987, as they probably could 
receive the detailed information on JNR’s privatization before it was publicly announced. 
Those regions could have the chance and incentive to do so, since in July 1982, the central 
government had approved the suggestion of JNR’s privatization and had started taking 
appropriate actions in 1983. And finally, the public announcement was made in 1987. After 
isochronous operation policy was operated, timetable for some regions changed on March 14th, 
1985, such as in Sendai (belong to JR East after 1987), Nagano (belong to JR East after 1987) 
and Keihanshin regions (Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe regions, which belong to JR West after 1987). 
Along with the change of timetable, the number of local trains operated those regions (belong 
to JR East and JR West after 1987) got huge increasement.  
Third, but not the least, different from HSR service which is only provided by JR Central 
company for the Tokyo-Osaka route after 1987, three different JR companies are in charge of 
CR transport services between Tokyo and Osaka. As these three JR companies are so different 
in population density and operating net income, their behavior might be different and that 
probably led to the estimated market competition results shown in this study. For conventional 





incentive for the JR companies to improve their services. The population density on Tokyo-
Atami route (JR East) is much higher than Maibara-Osaka (JR West), and the population 
density on Maibara-Osaka (JR West) is much higher than that on Atami-Maibara (JR Tokai). 
For JR companies, their operating net income somehow can show their ability and their budget 
to invest on infrastructure and their machines to improve their transport services. Take 2000-
2001 fiscal year as an example, the operating net income for JR East, JR Tokai and JR West 
was 69.2 billion JPY, 53.0 billion JPY and 31.0 billion JPY respectively, which is much 
different in amount (link in References). 
3.6 Conclusion 
Due to the privatization of Japanese National Railways (JNR) in 1987, it was geographically 
divided into six different railway companies for passenger transport service. This study 
investigated the impact of market competition on passengers’ time cost by conventional rail by 
using difference-in-difference approach. Results of the analysis which includes OD and year 
fixed effects (time-variant controls and time-invariant control), shows that market competition 
leads to an increment in passengers’ time cost by CR in duopoly regions when comparing with 
the change of time cost in monopoly region, but it is not statistically significant. After including 
the treatment by year analysis, statistically significant treatment effect is still not found in the 
treatment group (duopoly region). As a conclusion, market competition leads to an increment 
in passengers’ time cost by CR in duopoly regions when comparing with the change of time 














Appendix C  Market Structure and Travel Time of Parallel Railway 
Let us suppose there are two types of train services in parallel denoted by i = 1, 2. Demand of 
type i train service is a function of its own price as well as that of another are shown below:  
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖(𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑗) , 
which we specify as: 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖0 − 𝑎𝑖1𝑃𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖2𝑃𝑗 , for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∈  {1,2} 
 
and 𝑎𝑖0, 𝑎𝑖1, 𝑎𝑖2 being positive parameters, where 𝑄𝑖  is the demand and 𝑃𝑖 is the price of the 
type i train.  
Price consists of two parts: ticket price 𝑓𝑖 and passengers’ time cost 𝑡𝑖, then 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 
for i = 1, 2. Time cost 𝑡𝑖 of type i train determines the amount of required investment 𝐾𝑖(𝑡𝑖).  






In duopoly condition, two types of train services are provided by two different companies; 
while in monopoly condition, two types of train services are provided by one company. In 
duopoly case, each company tries to maximize its profit with respect to ticket price fi and time 
cost ti which can be written as: 
 
                                     max
𝑡𝑖
π𝑖 =  𝑓𝑖𝑄𝑖 ( 𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗) − 𝐾𝑖 (𝑡𝑖)                  









First order condition (FOC) is: 
𝑓𝑖(−𝑎𝑖1) − (−𝑘𝑖1+ 𝑘𝑖2𝑡𝑖
𝐷) = 0 
 
Then 
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FOC is :                        𝜕π
𝜕𝑡𝑖
 = 𝑓𝑖(−𝑎𝑖1) − (−𝑘𝑖1 + 𝑘𝑖2𝑡𝑖
𝑀)  + 𝑓𝑗𝑎𝑗2 = 0    
− 𝑎𝑖1𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗2𝑓𝑗 + 𝑘𝑖1
𝑘𝑖2
=  𝑡𝑖𝑀 
Then                                                         𝑡𝑖𝑀 =  
− 𝑎𝑖1𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎𝑗2𝑓𝑗 + 𝑘𝑖1
𝑘𝑖2
 
 𝑡𝑖𝐷 =  
− 𝑎𝑖1𝑓𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖1
𝑘𝑖2
                 














4. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Regional Income Inequality  
4.1 Introduction 
Trade liberalization and its impact have been a popular topic in international trade filed for 
decades (Edwards, 1993; Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Ferreira and Rossi, 2003; Wacziarg and 
Welch, 2008;). Many theoretical and empirical papers in the economic geography have been 
examining the effect of globalization on inequality in regional income. In terms of empirical 
work, Jian et al. (1996) shows that convergence occurs from 1978 to 1990 and divergence 
occurs after then. Moreover, Bouvet (2010) shows that globalization does not change regional 
income inequality. Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Pose (2013) and Lessmann and Seidel (2017) show 
that globalization leads to divergence.  
In terms of theoretical work, Dupont (2007) examines this topic using a variety expansion 
endogenous growth and the footloose capital model with agriculture and manufacturing goods. 
He shows that regional income inequality unambiguously shrinks because real income depends 
on expenditure relative to price index, and inequality in expenditure decrease and price index 
increases. Moreover, Minniti and Parello (2011) extends Dupont (2007) into a semi 
endogenous growth model. They show that globalization does not change regional income 
inequality at all because inequalities in expenditure and price index do not change at all. Cerina 
and Mureddu (2014) examines effects of agglomeration on inequality in regional income by 
introducing service sector, which is the main industry in advanced countries, but they did not 
examine effects of globalization on inequality in regional income. Fukuda (2019) shows that 
globalization increases or does not change inequality in regional income in a semi endogenous 
growth model with service sector because interregional spillover minus intraregional spillover 
in the service sector affect inequality in service price index.  
These theoretical results seem not to be consistent with empirical evidence as above 
explained. As well, all these studies not include the scale effect (lager population lead to higher 
growth rate in steady state) which actually effects in long period as mentioned in Kremer (1993) 
and Temple (2003). Motivated by these, we reexamine the effect of globalization on inequality 
in regional real income in an endogenous growth model with agriculture, manufacturing, and 
service goods. Results show that globalization increases, decreases, or does not change 
inequality in regional real income. This is because inequalities in expenditure and service price 





price index depends on the size of intraregional knowledge spillover minus interregional 
knowledge spillover from manufacturing sector. Effects on inequality in regional income 
depends on this effect. This result seems to be consistent with empirical evidence explained 
above because this model shows all of empirical results.  
4.2 The Model 
4.2.1 Basic Model Structure 
This study examines a two countries footloose capital model. Each consumer supplies one unit 
of labor inelastically in each period. Labor is the only production factor and serves as the 
numeraire. There are tradable manufacturing goods in the monopolistically competitive sector, 
tradable and numeraire agriculture goods in the perfectly competitive sector, and non-tradable 
service goods in the perfectly competitive sector. Each manufacturing firm chooses the location 
of production comparing profit levels. In the service sector, there are knowledge spillover from 
manufacturing goods sector. In the R&D sector, each firm chooses the location of R&D activity 
comparing the R&D costs. Due to intertemporal knowledge spillover, the number of varieties 
keep increasing. Consumer can invest in R&D activities in own country or the foreign country.  
4.2.2 Consumer 
The utility function is given by 
 
 





 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1, 
(1) 
   
where 𝜌 is the individual’s subjective discount rate, 𝐶𝑌 is consumption of agricultural goods, 
𝐶𝑆 is consumption of non-traded service goods, and 𝐶𝑀 is consumption of manufactured goods 
which depends on the consumption of a continuum of varieties given by 













, 𝜎 > 1, (2) 





where 𝑛  is the Northern varieties, 𝑛∗  is the Southern varieties,  𝑐𝑖(𝑡)  is the demand of 
domestically-produced i-th variety, 𝑐𝑗(𝑡) is the demand of imported j-th variety and 𝜎 > 1 is 
the elasticity of substitution between varieties.  
Instantaneous budget constraint is as follows: 
 
 𝐶𝑌 + 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑀 + 𝑃𝑠𝐶𝑠 = 𝐸 (3) 
 
where 𝑃𝑀 is price index of 𝐶𝑀, 𝑃𝑠 is the price of service goods, and 𝐸 is aggregate expenditure.  
Following Dupont (2007), Minniti and Parello (2011), and Fukuda (2019), price of 
agricultural goods is unity. Consumer’s maximization problem is consisting of  third stages. 
The first stage derives the demands for domestically produced and exported manufacturing 










Where 𝑃𝑀 = (∫ 𝑝𝑖1−𝜎𝑑𝑖
𝑛





1−𝜎  is the price index of manufacturing goods in 
the North and 𝐸𝑀(𝑡) is the northern expenditure for manufacturing goods.  
The second stage yields expenditure share for each good, and it is given by 
 
 
                  𝑌 = 𝛼𝐸, 𝐸𝑀(𝑡) ≡ 𝑃𝑀𝐶𝑀 = 𝛽𝐸, and 𝑃𝑠𝐶𝑠 = 𝛾𝐸.                           (5)    
 
   
Third stage is the dynamic utility maximization problem. The flow budget constraint is  
 
 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) + 𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑡), 
 
(6) 
   
where 𝑟(𝑡) is the rate of return on riskless bond and 𝐴(𝑡) is stock of financial asset. The 
Euler equation is given by 
 
?̇?(𝑡)






4.2.3 Production  
The agriculture good is produced in the perfectly competitive sector, and the production factor 
is the labor. One unit of labor produces one unit of agriculture goods. We assume that both 
countries produce this good, and wage in both countries are unity due to numeraire. Following 
Cerina and Mureddu (2014), the service good is non-traded goods, produced in the perfectly 










where 𝑎𝑠 is unit labor requirement for service goods in the home country and 𝑎𝑠∗ is unit labor 
requirement for service goods in the foreign country. Profit maximization yields: 
  
 𝑃𝑠 = 𝑎𝑠(𝑛, 𝑛∗) and 𝑃𝑠∗ = 𝑎𝑠∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗), (9) 
   
where 𝑛 is the number of northern manufacturing firms and 𝑛∗  is the number of southern 
manufacturing firms. 
Following Cerina and Mureddu (2014), unit labor requirement for service good depends 
negatively on agglomeration of manufacturing firms in the Home and Foreign countries as 





𝜕𝑛∗ ,   
𝜕𝑎𝑠∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗)
𝜕𝑛 , and 
𝜕𝑎𝑠∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗)
𝜕𝑛∗ < 0. 
(10) 
   
Moreover, we assume local knowledge spillover is equal to or strictly greater than 
international spillover, and it is 
 
                  |𝜃𝑛(𝑛, 𝑛∗)| ≥ |𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗)|, ∀(𝑛, 𝑛∗); |𝜃𝑛∗
∗ (𝑛, 𝑛∗)| ≥ |𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗)|, ∀(𝑛, 𝑛∗),        (11) 
   
Where 
 

















] ≡   [
𝜃𝑛(𝑛, 𝑛∗) 𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗)
𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗) 𝜃𝑛∗






is the knowledge spillover matrix. Finally, we assume a symmetric spillover matrix as 
follows:  
 𝜃𝑛(𝑛, 𝑛∗) = 𝜃𝑛∗
∗ (𝑛, 𝑛∗) < 0 and 𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗) = 𝜃𝑛∗(𝑛, 𝑛∗) < 0. (13) 
   
4.2.4 Manufacturing Firms 
Manufacturing goods are produced in the monopolistically competitive sector. Each firm need 
produce one unit of capital in the R&D sector and the number of world-wide manufacturing 
firms is the same with the amount of world-wide capital stock (see, i.e. Dupont, 2007; Minniti 
and Parello, 2011; Martin and Ottaviano, 1999;). 𝛽 units of labor can produce one unit of 
differentiate goods. Each firm chooses the location of the manufacturing comparing the profits 
in both countries. Moreover, serving the foreign market needs iceberg costs measured by 𝜏. 
The amount of world-wide capital is the same with the number of world-wide manufacturing 
firms: 
 𝐾𝑤(𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡) + 𝐾∗(𝑡) = 𝑛(𝑡) + 𝑛∗(𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑡). (14) 
   
Using demand function (5), profit maximizing derives the profit maximizing prices are 
given by 
 𝑝 = 𝑝∗ =
𝜎𝛽
𝜎 − 1. 
(15) 
   




𝜎 − 1 𝑥 and 𝜋
∗ =
𝜎𝛽
𝜎 − 1 𝑥
∗, (16) 
   
where   














],            (17) 
  
are sizes of firms in the North and South. In the equilibrium where manufacturing firms locate 
in both countries, Northern and Southern profits are equalized. Thus, the fraction of northern 



















 is the fraction of northern expenditure share. Substituting this back into the size 
of manufacturing firms yields 
 𝑥 = 𝑥∗ =
𝛼(𝜎 − 1)𝐸𝑤
𝛽𝜎𝑁 .  (19) 
   
4.2.5 R&D 





 , (20) 




𝑁(𝑡)[𝑠𝑛 + 𝜆(1 − 𝑠𝑛)]
, (21) 
   
is the intertemporal knowledge spillover, 𝐿𝐼(𝑡)  is the R&D labor, and 1 > 𝜆 > 0  is 
international spillover.  
The R&D sector is the perfectly competitive. In the equilibrium with R&D activity, the 




𝑁(𝑡)[𝑠𝑛 + 𝜆(1 − 𝑠𝑛)]
. (22) 
   
Consumer saves in two ways. The first way is riskless bond. The second is firms’ share 
whose rate of return is given by capital gain and dividend. So, the no-arbitrage condition is 




𝑉(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡). 
(23) 
   
The world-wide labor demand is composed of service goods, agriculture goods, 
manufacturing goods, and R&D. The world-wide labor supply is given by 2𝐿. The world-wide 
labor constraint is given by 
 
                                2𝐿 = 𝐿𝑀 + 𝐿𝑠 + 𝐿𝑌 + 𝐿𝐼 
    =
𝛼(𝜎 − 1)𝐸𝑤
𝜎 +
(1 − 𝛼)𝐸𝑤 +
𝑔







From now, we pay attention to the steady state equilibrium. Rewritten the no-arbitrage 
condition yields following relationship between growth rate, the world-wide expenditure, and 
the fraction of northern firms as follows:  
 
 −𝑔 + 𝛼𝐸𝑤[𝑠𝑛 + 𝜆(1 − 𝑠𝑛)] = 𝜌. (25) 
   
We finally derive the northern and southern expenditures using budget constraint. 
Rewritten budget constraints lead to 
 𝐸 = 𝑠𝐾𝜌𝑠𝑛+𝜆(1−𝑠𝑛) + 𝐿 and 𝐸
∗ = (1−𝑠𝑘)𝜌
𝑠𝑛+𝜆(1−𝑠𝑛)
+ 𝐿. (26) 
   
The world-wide expenditure and the northern expenditure share are given by  
 
 𝐸𝑤 = 𝜌
𝑠𝑛+𝜆(1−𝑠𝑛)























 is the northern share of physical capital.  
Combining (18) and (27), we derive the northern share of manufacturing firms, and it is 









𝜌 + 2𝐿(𝑡)[𝑠𝑛 + 𝜆(1 − 𝑠𝑛)]
. (28) 
 
The left-hand side of (28) is 45-degree line through the origin while the right-hand side of (28) 
is decreasing function of the northern share of manufacturing firms and lower limit of the right-
hand side of (28) is 1/2, as shown in Figure 4-1. Large population size ensures unique and 
existence of the northern share of manufacturing firms from (28). Moreover, (26) and (27) 
determine the northern expenditure, the northern expenditure share, and the world-wide 






Figure 4-1 Determination of the Northern Share of Manufacturing Firms 
4.3 Effects of globalization on regional income inequality 
In this study, it examine the effects of globalization on regional real income inequality in the 
steady state. The real income is defined as nominal expenditure divided by price index of 
manufacturing and price of service goods. We derive the effect of globalization on expenditure 














𝜕𝛿    
=
𝜌𝐿(1 − 𝜆)(1 − 2𝑠𝑘)
𝜕𝑠𝑛
𝜕𝛿
𝑠𝐸(1 − 𝑠𝐸){𝜌 + 2𝐿[𝑠𝑛 + 𝜆(1 − 𝑠𝑛)]}2
< 0.  
(29) 
 
As Dupont (2007) derived, the effect of globalization on the nominal expenditure 
inequality is negative because the north has a larger capital, and value of capital decreases due 
to globalization and knowledge spillover in the R&D sector. Northern expenditure decreases 
more, and the nominal expenditure inequality decreases as in Dupont (2007). 
We turn to derive the effect of globalization on inequality in manufacturing price index 














−[𝛿(1 + 𝛿) 𝜕𝑠𝑛𝜕𝛿 + 1 − 2𝑠𝑛]
(𝜎 − 1)[𝑠𝑛 + 𝛿(1 − 𝑠𝑛)][1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑠𝑛]
=
−(1 + 𝛿)2 𝜕𝑠𝐸𝜕𝛿




As Dupont (2007) pointed out, the effect of globalization on inequality in the 
manufacturing price index is composed of a direct openness effect, an indirect static effect, and 
an indirect dynamic effect. An indirect dynamic effect is common and does not affect inequality 
as in Dupont (2007). A direct openness effect is positive for both countries, but its effect is 
stronger for the South because 2𝑠𝑛−1
(𝜎−1)[𝑠𝑛+𝛿(1−𝑠𝑛)][1−(1−𝛿)𝑠𝑛]
> 0 measures differences between 
direct openness effect in the North and South. An indirect static effect is positive for the north 
but negative for the south, and 
−𝛿(1+𝛿)𝜕𝑠𝑛𝜕𝛿
(𝜎−1)[𝑠𝑛+𝛿(1−𝑠𝑛)][1−(1−𝛿)𝑠𝑛]
< 0 measures differences between 
indirect static openness effect in the North and South. A direct openness effect dominates an 
indirect static effect. So, the southern manufacturing price index decreases more, and inequality 
in manufacturing price index increases as in Dupont (2007). 
We turn to effect of globalization on inequality in the service price index, and it is 

















] ≤ 0. (31) 
   
As in Fukuda (2019), intraregional knowledge spillover is stronger or equal to 
interregional knowledge spillover in the service sector. Thus, the price of northern service price 
index may decrease relative to southern service price index, and the inequality in the service 
price index decreases or remain constant as in Fukuda (2019).    
From (29)−(31), globalization leads to increases in inequality in the regional real income 
if the intraregional knowledge spillover in the service goods sector is larger than the 
interregional knowledge spillover, and its size is large. Moreover, globalization leads to 
decrease in inequality in the regional real income if the intraregional knowledge spillover in 
the service goods sector is equal to the interregional knowledge. This result does not hold 
without footloose capital in this paper because southern manufacturing price index decreases 
relative to northern price index while the northern service price index does not change relative 





This result is different from existing theoretical results of footloose capital model because 
Dupont (2007) shows that inequality in the regional income decreases in an endogenous growth 
model with manufacturing and agriculture goods, Minniti and Parello (2011) shows that 
inequality in the regional income does not change in a semi endogenous growth model with 
manufacturing and agriculture goods, and Fukuda (2019) shows that the inequality in regional 
income increases or does not change in a semi endogenous growth model with manufacturing, 
agriculture, and service goods.13 
Because empirical paper shows that globalization may not affect or affect positively or 
negatively, the theoretical result seems to be consistent with empirical evidence.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This study examines effects of globalization on inequality in regional income in an 
endogenous growth model with the agriculture, manufacturing, and service goods. Results 
show that effects of globalization may positive, negative, or zero because the service price 
index and expenditure converge while the manufacturing price index diverges. Differences 
between interregional knowledge spillover minus intraregional knowledge spillover in the 















                                                 
13 As Martin and Ottaviano (1999) shows, growth rate measured by growth rate of number of varieties is common in both countries in steady 







For the topic about the impact of market competition on service quality, this dissertation 
contributes to related literatures by providing empirical evidences about the causal inference 
between market competition and service quality in railway industry, taking the privatization of 
JNR in 1987 as example. Passengers’ time cost was set as the outcome variable and a 
measurement for service quality in the two studies. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
even though there exist many literatures which investigate the relationship between market 
competition and service quality or even casual effect between market competition and service 
quality, quite few of them are in railway industry. Among the only remaining literatures about 
impact of market competition on service quality in railway industry, almost all of them are 
using theoretical approaches. Studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 about this topic were 
conducted by difference-in-differences (DID) approach through using a four-year panel data 
with OD pair and year fixed effects, which is a relatively good analysis approach and can 
eliminate the impact from potentially omitted variables. Therefore, either of these two studies 
could be one of the few empirical researches which analysis the causal effect by using relatively 
good econometric approach.  
In Chapter 2, it discussed the casual effect between market competition and the service 
quality of HSR service in Japan by using passengers’ time cost as the outcome variable. The 
empirical analysis results are consistent with the analysis results from those theoretical models. 
Results shows that market competition could increase the service quality, namely the market 
competition reduces passengers’ time cost in duopoly region where HSR competes with 
conventional rail, relative to that in monopoly region. The consistence in the results of market 
competition through several rounds of robustness checks provided the evidence for the 
reliability of the analysis results. Besides, the results in this study about market competition on 
HSR service quality showed that the impact of market competition was larger for a longer 
distance trip. 
Chapter 3 investigated the impact of market competition on the service quality of 
conventional rail after JNR’s privatization in 1987. With the passengers’ time cost as outcome 
variable and measurement for quality of CR service, the study in chapter 3 also employed the 
difference-in-differences (DID) method for analysis. However, the results in the analysis for 





the analysis from the theoretical models. No statistically significant evidences were found for 
the impact of market competition on CR service quality and potential reasons were listed in the 
discussion part of Chapter 3. Both of the studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute much 
in providing evidences about the market competition impact on service quality in railway 
industry, where with quite few empirical studies about impact of market competition, 
especially using reliable econometric approach. 
The study in Chapter 4 contributes to literatures that related to the effect of globalization 
on regional inequality in regional real income. In Chapter 4, it reexamined the effect of trade 
globalization on inequality in regional real income in an endogenous growth model with 
agriculture, manufacturing and services goods. Results showed that globalization increases, 
decreases, or does not change inequality in regional real income. This is because inequalities 
in nominal expenditure and service price index decrease, but inequality in manufacturing price 
index increases. Moreover, inequality in service price index depends on the size of 
intraregional knowledge spillover minus interregional knowledge spillover from 
manufacturing sector. Different from those theoretical results which seemed not to be 
consistent with empirical evidence as showed in existed literatures, the results of study in 
chapter 4 as listed above seemed to be consistent with empirical evidences explained in those 
literatures because this model shows all of empirical results.  
Additionally, as a member of Taoyaka program, I would like to point out how the three 
studies in this dissertation contribute to the development of disadvantaged areas which is one 
important goal of Taoyaka program. Transportation is an important necessity in daily lives, 
especially for the people live in rural and disadvantaged areas in Japan, under the aging and 
depopulation background. The inconvenience and relative higher transportation cost in 
disadvantage areas is due to lack of competition. Studies in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 somehow 
provide evidences for a way to solve the rural transportation problem which is create market 
competition, such as provide policy convenience and financial subsidy for private 
transportation service providers. The third study provides suggestions for the economic 
development in disadvantage countries which is increase the international knowledge spillover 
from the developed countries, such as employing engineers from developed countries which 
can help developing countries to learn more about the advanced technology. Therefore, the 





Besides, as a Taoyaka student, I and my team members carried out onsite team project in 
Nijo district (Musuda shi, Shimane prefecture) with the goal to achieve rural revitalization 
under the aging and depopulation background. Since we proposed to achieve the rural 
revitalization through sixth industry by using its wild animal resources, we took three rounds 
of surveys among different kinds of respondents about their experience of tasting smoked wild 
boar meat and their willingness to pay (WTP) for smoked wild boar meat. Results show that: 
a. Most people have no experience for tasting smoked wild boar meat, but they hear that it is 
with good taste and rich nutrition; b. Most people are satisfied with its taste after tasting the 
sample and have strong WTP for the smoked wild boar meat product; c. WTP for 30 grams are 
567 JPY for respondents in Hiroshima, 347 JPY for respondents in Masuda and 125 JPY among 
international students respectively. These survey results suggest that local people should 
increase the scale of the business if under environment sustainability and sell the products to 
relatively bigger cities where have more customers with higher WTP. The potential more 
income from smoked wild boar business could bring more job opportunities and create 
incentives to bring new bloods to Nijo. Besides, tourism could be one of other choices for local 
people to increase income and attract new residents. As well, tourism can also be a good 
advertisement and promotion for local products.  
Finally, in the future, when the passenger volume data of OD pairs in railway industry is 
easily to access as the passenger volume data of OD pairs in airline industry, we could have a 
more interesting and more direct investigation about the impact of market competition on 
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